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COVID-19 and the Chinese Christian Community in Britain: Changing Patterns 
of Belonging and Division 
YINXUAN HUANG, KRISTIN AUNE, and MATHEW GUEST 
ABSTRACT 
This article draws on interview data with Chinese Christian leaders to explore how the 
coronavirus pandemic is affecting the Chinese Christian church in Britain. Based upon 12 
semi-structured interviews conducted with Christian leaders in nine cities, the research 
identifies the ways in which the COVID-19 outbreak is shaping the dynamics of intra-group 
and inter-group connectedness within and beyond the Chinese church in Britain. It finds that 
COVID-19 is playing a significant role in social connectedness. This manifests in three ways: 
the re-configuration of a sense of belonging at church, the perception of outreach and 
evangelism, and the relationship between Chinese Christians from different regional 
backgrounds. These findings outline that the COVID-19 pandemic is triggering both 
cohesion and division. On one hand, the outbreak is functioning as an incubator for a 
stronger sense of belonging to the church and appears to encourage the church to reach out 
to seekers and the wider community. On the other hand, the pandemic is also dividing the 
Chinese church through conflicts in political views and social attitudes. Such conflicts, which 
are primarily about democratic values and views of China’s communist regime, are 
particularly observable between Mandarin-speaking Christians from mainland Chinese 
backgrounds and Cantonese-speaking Christians from Hong Kong backgrounds. The article 
argues that the coronavirus pandemic has initiated deeper reconstruction and reform in the 
Chinese Christian community in Britain in terms of organization and mission.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is almost a cliché that the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to unprecedented social changes 
to the world as we know it. As Christian groups worldwide step into the crisis, their 
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responses to the pandemic will have significant impacts on the dynamics of Christianity at 
local, national, and global levels. Among all affected Christian groups, overseas Chinese 
Christian churches (OCCCs) in Western societies are a unique population facing distinct 
challenges.  On one hand, like other religious groups, the Chinese church has to cope with 
the immediate impact of the pandemic for its congregations and review its role in wider 
society, including uncertainties concerning the sustainability of congregational life under 
COVID-19 conditions. On the other hand, the ‘Chinese origin’ of the pandemic clearly 
presents a significant impact on the perception of the wider Chinese community globally. 
Importantly, such impact tends to affect all ‘visible’ Chinese migrants from mainland China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries. This is observable, for example, 
through media coverage of racism and xenophobia against East Asians in Britain (Weale 
2020).The pandemic thus has the potential to push OCCCs to re-negotiate their ethnic and 
religious identities in response to these new social and political issues in both their countries 
of origin as well as hosting countries.  
This study explores the religious implications of COVID-19 for OCCCs from a social 
capital perspective. In the light of this approach, we consider the underlying logic of the 
church in terms of varieties of intra-group and inter-group relationships – amongst regular 
churchgoers, between church leaders and members, and with other religious and secular 
groups in the wider community. Using Chinese Christian churches in Britain as an example, 
this paper addresses the impact of COVID-19 on the relational aspects of OCCCs. We 
discuss the existing literature on the social capital approach to religion in the next section 
and, subsequently, give an overview of the historical and contemporary context of the British 
Chinese Christian Churches (BCCCs). In the third section of the essay, we present the 
findings from our study of BCCCs using data from 12 interviews with church leaders. Our 




RELIGION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
There is a burgeoning body of literature that adopts a social capital approach to religion, 
analysing religion in terms of the generation and maintenance of social connections and 
resources (Putnam 2000; Coleman 2003; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Huang 2015). The 
concept of social capital is defined by Harvard sociologist and political scientist Robert 
Putnam (2000: 19) as ‘connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’. Putnam and others regard religion as 
an important setting for social capital, as social relationships play a pivotal role in religion. 
Social capital researchers are therefore concerned with the form, characteristics, and 
consequences of interpersonal and social networks. In his bestseller Bowling Alone, Putnam 
(2000: 66) quotes an activist co-pastor of the Dorchester Temple Baptist Church in Boston to 
elucidate the significance of the social capital perspective on religion: ‘The church is people. 
It’s not a building; it’s not an institution, even. It is relationships between one person and the 
next’. In the first place, relationships are the very substance of any congregation – its basic 
woven fabric. Christian life, from a children's crèche during Sunday service to a large 
national gospel event, would not exist without the relational dimension.  
The church is maintained through layers of relationships, involving its ministers, 
elders, co-workers, ordinary participants, and external parties. The nature of these links can 
be understood using Coleman’s distinction between vertical and horizontal relationships 
(Coleman 2003: 37). Vertical relationships are embedded in the hierarchical structure of a 
congregation. By fostering passivity and subordination, some forms of vertical relationships 
between church leaders and others can be distant (Coleman 2003: 38). The primary focus of 
this study is on the other type of relationship: horizontal relationships, of which there are two 
types. The first type involves internal connectedness between church attendees with 
different sociocultural characteristics such as language, ethnicity, and social class. The 
second type of relationship is external and relates to the congregation’s contact with other 
religious organizations and wider society.    
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The social outcomes of horizontal relationships – the social capital transmitted 
through them – can be described as either ‘bonding’ or ‘bridging’ (Putnam 2000; Wuthnow 
2002). Bonding relationships reinforce in-group connectedness and identities, while bridging 
relationships bring together people across socially and culturally constructed boundaries. 
(Interfaith work is an example of bridging social capital.) ‘Bridging social capital can generate 
broader identities and reciprocity’, explains Putnam (2000, p. 23), ‘whereas bonding social 
capital bolsters our narrower selves.’ In migrant churches, the strong presence of bonding 
social capital in the form of close, supportive friendships is self-evident. For example, many 
Asian Christian churches in North America were inspired by a mission to help their co-ethnic 
peers to settle in the host country (Noh and Avison 1996). However, bridging relationships 
have increasingly become more visible with the increase in immigration to Western 
countries. The American literature asserts that mainline Protestant churches play a vital role 
in drawing together diversities within local communities, encouraging interethnic contact and 
generating interpersonal trust and collaboration (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 194). As we 
discuss in the next section, some migrant churches have also experienced growing internal 
diversity that presents new challenges for unity and cohesion.  
Most previous research on religion and social capital has been conducted in an 
American context. As Putnam and Campbell (2010: 7, 523) point out, ‘Americans have high 
rates of religious belonging, behaving, and believing’, and ‘most Americans are intimately 
acquainted with people of other faiths’. Britain and other parts of Western Europe present a 
somewhat different picture. Data from the 2011 UK Census and other national 
representative social surveys in Britain suggest that Christianity has been suffering a 
persistent decline in Britain in terms of both numbers and religiosity (Voas and Crockett 
2005). Parallel to this has been a growth in the Muslim, Sikh and Hindu population. While 
some white-majority churches and older Christian denominations are experiencing decline 
(for example, Anglicanism and Methodism), it is spurious to assume that the social function 
of religion has declined in the case of migrant churches in Britain. Scholars have argued that 
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patterns of immigration and religiosity criss-cross each other in a bewildering variety of ways 
and may illustrate a complicated state of affairs (Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Davie 2015; 
Huang 2015). As far as Christianity is concerned, Goodhew (2012) finds a substantial church 
growth in Britain between 1980 and 2010; this is particularly discernible among ethnic 
minorities and provides a critique of the notion of dechristianization in Britain. However, the 
issue of social capital is still relatively under-researched in the study of British churches, 
especially when it comes to ethnic minority congregations such as BCCCs.  
The CHINESE CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN BRITAIN 
While the influx of Chinese migrants and international students in the UK has attracted some 
scholarly attention (Gu and Schweisfurth 2015), few engage with the religious aspect of 
Chinese migration. The history of the first Chinese settlements in Britain can be traced to the 
early nineteenth century, when early Chinese migrants made a considerable contribution to 
imperial Britain’s expansion of maritime trading ambitions in East Asia (Parker 1997). The 
timeline of Chinese migration to Britain after World War II (WWII) is divisible into two main 
parts. In the 1950s-80s, most overseas Chinese entering the UK were Cantonese-speaking 
people from Hong Kong and two mainland Chinese provinces (Guangdong and Fujian). After 
the 1980s, changes in domestic politics and international relations in mainland China 
resulted in the arrival of new waves of immigrants from mainland China and Hong Kong. 
Since China’s economic reform in the late 1970s, the Mandarin-speaking Chinese population 
has been growing rapidly in the UK. International university students from China are a 
prominent example. According to Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) figures, the UK 
attracted more than 120,000 students from mainland China alone for the 2018-19 academic 
year, nearly five times the number from India, the second-largest sending country (27,000). 
The figure from China represents almost a fivefold increase since 2000. Meanwhile, a large 
number of Hong Kongese started to settle in the UK in the 1980s as a response to the 1984 
Sino–British Joint Declaration, which led to the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s 
Republic of China in 1997. It now appears that the beginnings of a ‘new wave’ or ‘new 
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exodus’ may be coming from Hong Kong as a result of the uncertainties related to the 
Umbrella Movement of 2014 (Chow, forthcoming).  
In 1951, Reverend Stephen Y.T. Wang founded the first notable Chinese Christian 
congregation in post-WWII Britain, namely the Chinese Church in London (CCIL). Wang was 
also founder of the Chinese Overseas Christian Mission (COCM) in 1950. Now based in 
Milton Keynes, COCM has developed as the largest and leading Chinese Christian 
evangelical mission organization in Europe. The pioneering work of COCM and CCIL has 
resulted in Chinese fellowships and churches in many parts of the British Isles, all of which 
include Cantonese-speaking restaurant workers and students who stayed on after their 
studies, the latter often taking up white collar work (Chow, forthcoming).  
Language plays a key role in the development of BCCCs. While early BCCCs were 
predominantly Cantonese-speaking, the emergence of the second and third generations of 
British-born Chinese as well as the arrival of increasing numbers of Mandarin-speaking 
immigrants from mainland China began to change the migrant community’s profile in the late 
1980s. As a response to the new situation, in the past three decades COCM and many 
historical BCCCs have developed Mandarin-speaking and English-speaking ministries 
alongside their Cantonese-speaking ministries. In the twenty-first century, the growth of 
Mandarin-speaking ministries has been much faster than the other two. Since most new 
Chinese immigrants come to Britain as students, skilled workers or entrepreneurs, city 
centres and university towns across Britain have become significant mission fields, with 
these ministries targeting students and new immigrants from mainland China.   
It is worth mentioning that diversity within BCCCs is more than a dichotomy of 
mainland China versus Hong Kong. First, other East Asian and Southeast Asian states 
including Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore have also been prominent sending regions of 
ethnic Chinese immigrants to Britain (Chow, forthcoming). Chinese migrants from these 
states have largely enriched the dynamics of linguistic and cultural components of BCCCs. 
For example, while both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese are native Mandarin speakers, 
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their upbringing is largely distinct due to differences in political and social structure in the two 
regions. Second, multilingual skills have allowed mobility between different BCCC sub-
congregations. Although older UK populations would be Cantonese-dominant, those who 
have facilities in Mandarin have been able to support the origins of Mandarin-speaking 
ministries. Bilingual or trilingual skills are nowadays not an uncommon requirement for 
Chinese religious workers in Europe.  
Although the social dynamics of BCCCs have rarely been explored, the previous 
literature highlighted that OCCCs in Western societies are highly generative of community 
life and social connectedness (Chen 2002). Early sociological studies of BCCCs observed 
that the Chinese migrant churches in London are among the few successful examples of 
surviving and thriving Chinese migrant communities in Britain (Jones 1987). Owing to its 
traditions of collective worship, common fellowship and often tight-knit community, 
Christianity can be ‘a powerful remedy for the lack of institutional affiliation commonly seen 
among Chinese in the diaspora’ (Li 2019). A church may serve as not only a spiritual home, 
but also an incubator for social support, a proxy for Western values and culture, and a hub 
for connecting with the local community. Hence, it is not surprising to see that, as the two 
predominant groups amongst religious Chinese in Britain, Chinese Christians have 
expanded to almost double the number of their Buddhist counterparts (ONS, 2015). This is 
completely different from the religious landscape of the sending countries of ethnic Chinese.     
Meanwhile, the recent development of BCCCs fosters communities and cohesion as 
well as boundaries and division. Chow (forthcoming) points out that ‘the more established 
overseas Chinese have needed to cross a number of linguistic, cultural, and socioeconomic 
boundaries in order to work with these new waves of immigrants’. In studying BCCCs, we 
suggest that three caveats should be addressed when we think of religion as a context for 
social capital. The first caveat concerns the cultural aspect that underpins BCCCs’ mission. 
Like many other OCCCs in the West, BCCCs are largely made of converts and develop an 
evangelical Christian culture (Rao 2017; Li 2019). Nevertheless, empirical evidence 
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suggests that Chinese evangelicalism does not necessarily break culturally constructed 
boundaries beyond the Chinese congregation, especially when it comes to the civic 
engagement of OCCCs in the hosting society. For example, Christian evangelism among 
mainland Chinese Christians in Britain and other Western societies tends to reinforce ethnic 
boundaries and articulates a unified, Chinese-centred identity (Huang and Hsiao 2015; Li 
2019). The second caveat has to do with the boundaries between Mandarin, Cantonese, 
and English sub-congregations within the realm of BCCCs. The religious upbringing of 
Chinese mainlanders is different from that of other Chinese immigrants  as the former is 
deeply influenced by the regime’s anti-religious ideology and policies. (Yang, 2011). Benton 
(2011) noted that the younger generations of British-born Chinese tend to distance 
themselves from Chinese languages due to the awareness that English-language education 
can better ensure social integration and upward social mobility. Recent political unrest in 
Hong Kong, from the 2014 Umbrella Movement to the 2019-20 Fugitive Offenders 
amendment bill protests, is likely to have disrupted the relationship between Mandarin-
speaking and Cantonese-speaking communities in Britain. Finally, it is important to monitor 
the social context of Britain. By ‘social context’, we mean the social issues that are relevant 
to the integration and livelihood of the Chinese community and the development of 
Christianity in Britain. The social context can be highly dynamic as it is determined by 
changing social as well as demographic, economic, and political factors at both local and 
national levels; it is key to understand how BCCCs and their social institutions respond to 
and interact with British society.   
 
COVID-19 AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CHINESE CHURCH IN BRITAIN 
The empirical analysis of this study is based on 12 semi-structured interviews with Christian 
leaders conducted between March and April 2020. These constitute ‘elite interviews’, as they 
draw on the unique experiences and resources of influential insiders. As Moyser (2011) 
explains, elite interviews provide exclusive first-hand information by enabling the 
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interviewees to comment upon events or evidence, provide insights and interpretations and 
suggest fruitful lines of inquiry.  
There is no clear-cut definition of the term ‘elite’ (Harvey 2015). In the case of 
BCCCs, ministers, directors, and other figureheads of churches and Christian organizations 
are not necessarily the only leaders with elite status. Fellowship leaders and church 
managers interviewed for this study hold important strategic positions in relevant social 
networks and are thus better able to exert influence on specific circles of congregants 
(defined by age, language, or occupation within BCCCs) and oversee internal and external 
changes. The 12 interviewees include two board members of national mission organizations 
(COCM and UK Ambassadors for Christ (UKAFC)), a minister and a manager at CCIL, and 
religious leaders and workers (three pastors, two elders, and three fellowship leaders) at 
other OCCCs in Britain. Their experiences cover different components of BCCCs ministry in 
terms of language (i.e. Mandarin, Cantonese, and English), location (including London, 
Manchester, Cambridge, York, Coventry, Bristol, Cardiff, and Edinburgh), and mission (e.g. 
teaching, student fellowship, and outreach). Combined, they offer in-depth insights on how 
COVID-19 is shaping the relationships of BCCCs from a wide range of perspectives. A fuller 
story of congregational life, one that includes more diverse views and critique of church 
leaders, can be told via interviews with members and attendees, but leaders’ interviews are 
nonetheless important. 
The participants were initially asked open-ended questions, which were followed up 
by closed questions. While open-ended questions allow participants to articulate their views, 
closed questions, designed specifically for each participant’s unique background and 
experience, allow us to obtain specific data relating to the impact of COVID-19 on 




The Re-configuration of Believing and Belonging 
Unsurprisingly, COVID-19 has turned the congregational life of BCCCs upside down. All 12 
Christian leaders interviewed for this study felt that Chinese churches and mission 
organizations in Britain are stepping into uncharted territory. An immediate challenge that all 
BCCCs must face is the pandemic itself. For Chinese churchgoers, COVID-19 presents a 
trade-off between belonging and security. Chinese churches across Britain experienced 
significant reduction in attendance during the first two weeks of February when around half 
of their regular churchgoers chose to stay away from Sunday services. BCCCs have 
responded to the fear of pandemic within the congregation in both spiritual and practical 
ways. Many congregations have taken proactive measures to respond to the spread of virus, 
including updating news and information on their websites and social media, providing 
sanitisers on church premises, and tracing the travel history of participants and urging self-
isolation as appropriate (Huang, 2020). Moreover, seven of the eight interviewees who had 
preached since the beginning of the outbreak mentioned that they had revised their sermons 
to talk about disasters described in the Bible, such as the plagues of Egypt, to share Biblical 
perspectives on causes of disasters and rewards of faith. Hence, while COVID-19 has 
sabotaged religious gatherings, it is also becoming a symbolic currency that is being used to 
re-organize and reshuffle the Chinese congregation in the long term.      
Another major variance in congregational life is the role of technology. Due to the 
lockdown, all religious gatherings in Britain had to move online, if they wished to continue, 
from 23rd March 2020. Sermons, Bible studies, small groups and the like are currently being 
hosted and streamed via media and conferencing platforms including YouTube, Zoom, and 
WeChat. The inevitable use of technology to replace physical gatherings is unprecedented in 
church history in that it is a fundamental change in the communal practice and communion 
of the church. In the case of BCCCs, technology has created both opportunities and 
challenges. On one hand, it has led to the revival of many BCCCs. Most of the church 
leaders in this study noted that a large number of congregants who stopped attending 
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church due to the outbreak had gradually returned after gatherings moved online. The 
flexibility of online gatherings has also allowed some groups, particularly students, to initiate 
additional online activities during the week. On the other hand, online congregational life has 
created exclusion and division. A consensus among the interviewees is that elderly people 
have largely been excluded from online congregational events due to poor knowledge of 
relevant software. In addition, online gathering also appears to sabotage opportunities for 
bridging social capital. A prominent example is that despite efforts to bring together 
members from Mandarin, Cantonese, and English sub-congregations of BCCCs, a unified 
gathering of the three has been almost impossible during the pandemic due to the technical 
difficulties of assigning interpreters in online meetings.  
While it has hindered bridging social capital, the pandemic has led to relationship 
renewal within BCCCs. All 12 interviews suggest that the relationships among the 
congregants who continued to attend church gatherings after the initial outbreak of COVID-
19 in Britain appear to have been significantly strengthened. The urgent missions to respond 
to the pandemic and keep the church working have led attendees to cultivate contacts, 
collaboration, and reciprocity within Chinese churches. Hence, bonding social capital within 
BCCCs has been reinforced by a moralized sense of group attachment – a feeling of ‘stay 
with us’ as opposed to ‘leave us’ (Williams 2003: 181). According to Feng, a COCM board 
member, COVID-19 has positively contributed to the spirituality and work efficiency of lay 
leaders and co-workers of COCM and BCCCs:    
The pandemic is like a filter – now only the most dedicated have 
chosen to serve together. Although some of them take up the role quite 
recently, the team chemistry of co-workers during the pandemic has 
been very encouraging in general … they connect well because they 




New Opportunities for Bridging Social Capital 
As a Christian institution, BCCCs distinguishes itself from secular Chinese organizations 
such as clan associations and the Chinese Students and Scholars Association by 
functioning as a sanctuary haven from hardships and fear created by the pandemic. The 
function is particularly attractive to many Chinese who are under pressure due to isolation 
and loneliness during the lockdown. Notwithstanding the loss of former participants, most of 
the church leaders in our study maintain that attendance at weekly online Sunday services 
and fellowships has started to grow since the lockdown began. Lin, a UKAFC board 
member, suggests that a large proportion of the new population consists of university 
students and young professionals who are single. For these new BCCC constituents, it is 
primarily a sense of belonging, problem solving, and other benefits of social capital (rather 
than Christian faith itself) that motivates them to stay. Nevertheless, this development has 
inspired many BCCC leaders who hope the pandemic will contribute to a potential ‘mass 
conversion’ (Yang and Tamney, 2006: 125) of the Chinese in Britain to Christianity. The idea 
has resulted in a degree of implicit competition among Chinese churches. Interestingly, since 
the lockdown has largely eroded the location advantages of churches, Chinese churches 
and fellowships are now striving to attract not only Chinese people in their local areas, but 
also in other parts of Britain.    
While serving Chinese migrant communities has always been at the core of BCCCs’ 
evangelistic culture, COVID-19 has obliged BCCCs to develop their congregational norms of 
community engagement. The church’s community engagement exemplifies how COVID-19 
is inspiring new forms of bridging capital. One mechanism that drives such community 
engagement among BCCCs is racism. All 12 Christian leaders interviewed had personally 
received reports of their congregants being subject to hate crimes, racist abuse or COVID-19 
related bullying. Some BCCCs with richer resources have organized counselling sessions to 
support the victims, the majority of whom are pupils at local schools. These incidents, 
combined with increasing media coverage of racism and xenophobia against East Asian 
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communities in the West, have impelled BCCCs leadership to reconsider their relationship 
with the wider community. They have been seeking to reduce an inherent tension between 
the self-interest embedded in a Chinese-centred mission and the civic function of the Church 
by articulating a mission to re-evangelise Britain – a place that had a huge historic impact on 
modern Chinese Christianity but has become more secular in recent decades. A direct 
product of this effort is the PPE (personal protective equipment) ministry of BCCCs, which 
has been coordinated by lay leaders in major British cities including London, Manchester, 
Coventry, Birmingham, and Cardiff. The PPE ministry functions in two ways: co-workers for 
the ministry, some of whom are supported by COCM, either organize donations of PPE to 
local hospitals or distribute free surgical masks in large supermarkets. The masks are 
packed in bags with Bible verses on salvation, hope, and love as well as information about 
churches in the local area. Haidong, an elder at a Chinese church in a large British city, 
discusses how the church set out to influence the community via its social ministry: 
The ministry is a way of implementing the Gospel’s call to love people, 
including those who do not believe and those who are not like you. 
When we give these masks out to local residents, we tell them that 
Jesus Christ loves them; and as both a body of Jesus Christ and 
citizens of Britain, the Chinese church loves Britain and cares about 
British people.  
Finally, our study suggests that social issues related to COVID-19 in the sending countries of 
Chinese migrants have functioned as a medium for new social capital as described in this 
paper. This is particularly obvious in the case of the Mandarin sub-congregation of BCCCs, 
which has been relatively prone to political and community insularity. All participants 
mentioned Li Wenliang, a whistle-blowing mainland Chinese doctor whose death was met 
with immense outrage and frustration across China and sparked an unusual demand for 
freedom of speech on China’s social media (Huang 2020). This series of events has been 
widely discussed among BCCC leaders. Also crucial is the timing of the discussion, as 
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government-sponsored crackdowns, persecution against church leaders, and stricter 
religious regulations continue to challenge the survival of Christianity in Xi Jinping’s China. 
Socially and psychologically, Chinese Christians in China became, during the second half of 
the twentieth century, part of the Chinese citizenry, with their Christian identity no longer 
distinguishing them from other people; Yi calls this the move ‘from Christian aliens to 
Chinese citizens’ (2010). However, COVID-19 has motivated a considerable number of 
ministers and lay leaders of BCCCs to develop an ideology of difference from China, based 
on the Biblical message of being the light and the salt of the world, as a response to what 
they perceive as a lack of virtues, justice, and freedom in mainland Chinese society. 
Importantly, this ideology does more than point to wrongs that need to be righted. In a social 
capital discourse, it helps convince people that they can do something about the wrongs by 
joining the side of the right – namely Christianity (Williams 2003: 182). 
 
Conflict and Division 
The impact of COVID-19 on the social capital of BCCCs is by no means entirely positive. 
The pandemic is tending to sabotage the internal connectedness across BCCCs by 
exacerbating the divisions between Mandarin, Cantonese, and English sub-congregations. 
In particular, all Christian leaders in our study who are involved in church ministry described 
the picture of an elevated ‘conflict’ between members with mainland Chinese backgrounds in 
the Mandarin group and members with Hong Kong backgrounds in the other two groups. 
Although cultural boundaries such as language between Cantonese-speaking and 
Mandarin-speaking Chinese Christians have been documented (e.g. Li 2019; Chow, 
forthcoming), the more recent conflict relating to COVID-19 is rooted in the uneasy political 
relations between mainland China and Hong Kong. 
  In the past decade, Hong Kong has witnessed a wave of massive campaigns for 
political self-determination. The most recent example was the 2019-20 Anti-China Extradition 
Bill protests, for which millions of Hong Kongese went into the streets for the protection of 
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Hong Kong’s existing freedoms such as freedom of speech and religion from government 
intervention. According to three interviewees who have been involved in Cantonese ministry 
for at least ten years, Hong Kong Christians in Britain, particularly the younger immigrant 
generations, reacted to the protests by articulating their Hong Kong identity and distancing 
themselves from China. Although most church leaders tend to consider politics as earthly 
issues and urge their congregations to love their enemies, a significant part of the 
Cantonese-speaking sub-congregation still take up the call for social justice, freedom, and 
democracy in Hong Kong and openly express these political values. During the pandemic, 
many young Hong Kong Christians in BCCCs have been critical of the Chinese government, 
condemning the regime on the grounds of inhumane measures and COVID-19 cover-ups. 
While most of them would share this view only on social media such as Facebook and 
Twitter when China was still the centre of the outbreak, many more would openly accuse 
and criticise the Chinese government during church gatherings as the pandemic hit and 
escalated in Britain. 
These accusations have been disputed and criticised by mainland Chinese 
Christians for being prejudiced and overkill, leading to confrontations in many aspects of 
congregational life. On the individual level, the study participants noted that conflicting views 
have triggered heated arguments between mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Christians. 
Most of the arguments took place in online church groups and conversations. Moreover, the 
conflict also appears to have sabotaged the cohesion and collaboration between mainland 
Chinese and Hong Kong Christians on the group level. As mentioned above, COVID-19 has 
resulted in a renewal of bonding social capital in BCCCs. However, such effect is only 
observable only within the sub-congregation and has rarely motivated collective or 
collaborative work between mainland Chinese Christians and other Chinese Christians. One 
minister who serves in both Cantonese and Mandarin ministry described the ways in which 
conflicting political views generate divisions: 
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The clash [between political views] is tearing the church apart. It started 
during the [Anti-China Extradition Bill] and has become worse during 
the COVID-19 outbreak. Brothers and sisters do not feel like praying 
together, working together, or even talking to each other. I have 
witnessed wars in student fellowships, family gatherings, and even on 
social media…It is painful to watch. And both sides call on the church 
leaders to support the political views they express.  
Consequently, our interviews suggest that the pandemic is presenting a negative 
effect on the more or less institutionalized social capital of members of BCCCs, as the 
aggregate of trust, collaboration, and cohesion is suffering a significant decline at the 
collective level.  A key point to grasp is that the conflict has to do with how the two groups as 
well as other Chinese Christians reaffirm ethnic, cultural, and religious identities by 
examining their social and political status in both sending and hosting societies – processes 
that have been called ‘reactive ethnicity’ and ‘reactive religiosity’ in previous studies of ethnic 
minorities in the West (Diehl and Schnell, 2006; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Unlike their 
Cantonese counterparts, the majority of the Mandarin-speaking Christians of BCCCs were 
brought up in mainland China, where criticism of the Chinese government is deemed 
symptomatic of Western powers’ inherent hostility against China’s rise rather than the 
progress of civil and political rights. Hence, mainland Chinese Christians, like many other 
migrants from mainland China, tend to forge stronger national identity and express 
nationalistic values as a response to the West’s criticism of China (Shi, 2014). Paradoxically, 
although social issues relating to COVID-19 have motivated more Mandarin-speaking 
Christians to openly to discuss religious freedom and social justice, some of the church 
leaders we interviewed insist that Mandarin congregations are usually more reluctant to point 
fingers at the Chinese government and its political leaders than are Cantonese-speaking 
Christians. By contrast, Mandarin-speaking Christians tend to use the language of 
‘submitting to governing authorities’ and often cite Romans 13:1-7 as biblical support for 
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having faith in the ruling regime. As Britain descended from a safe zone into one of the 
hardest-hit European countries in the pandemic, the voice of Mandarin-speaking Christians 
has changed to a more pro-China position. More than half of our interview participants 
mentioned that a considerable proportion of mainland Chinese Christians in their 
congregations feel ‘unwelcome’ and ‘stranded’ in the West and hope to go back to China. 
While this feeling is partly influenced by media coverage and individual experiences of 
racism and xenophobia, it is also reflected in mainlanders’ belief that the Chinese system is 
working better than the British system in terms of both containing the virus and dealing with 
potential economic and social problems. On the contrary, although Britain’s conduct has also 
been criticized across Cantonese and English sub-congregations, this has rarely been 
translated into a recognition of the Chinese regime’s virus-related successes among many, 
particularly younger generations of BCCCs who are from Hong Kong.    
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This paper has explored how COVID-19 is affecting the Chinese Christian community in 
Britain from a social capital perspective. The results from 12 interviews with national and 
local level Christian leaders show that the pandemic is bringing both cohesion and division to 
BCCCs. On the one hand, COVID-19 unites Chinese Christians by fostering fresh bonding 
and bridging social capital in times of crisis. The dynamics of such internal and external 
connectedness have helped BCCCs in establishing effective leaderships, renewing its 
evangelistic culture, and developing a social, public mission. On the other hand, however, 
the pandemic has made the existing boundaries among Chinese Christians even sharper. 
Christian leaders in this study reveal how culturally and politically constructed barriers 
between mainland Chinese and Hong Kong Christians in BCCCs have been hardened 
during the pandemic. Trust and reciprocity thus remain frozen in these groups and becomes 




. Our  research has several limitations of our research; more comprehensive 
investigation is required of the challenges and opportunities that BCCCs face in a COVID-19 
fuelled Britain. One such limitation is that this study is unable to reflect the diversity of 
BCCCs, which is much more than a simple division between Mandarin-speaking Chinese, 
Cantonese-speaking Hong Kongese, and English-speaking British born Chinese 
participants. Chinese immigrant generations from other regions such as Taiwan, Malaysia, 
and Singapore represent a considerable population in BCCCs. For example, while political 
views and value orientations have become a source of conflict between mainland Chinese 
and Hong Kong Christians, they may well be a mechanism for unity or separation for other 
groups (e.g. between Taiwanese and Hong Kongese) as well. Methodologically, the use of 
elite interviews has a significant shortfall as it can only offer insights from the leadership’s 
perspective. This method does not allow us to examine, for example, the notion of social 
capital in BCCCs from the participants’ perspective. A line of inquiry that deserves further 
exploration is how the impact of COVID-19 on BCCCs can be explained by variations of 
personal experiences such as migration history and occupational attainment. Finally, we see 
a need to consider contextual differences on the macro level to advance the analysis of the 
impact of the pandemic on Christianity. The study of BCCCs should not lose sight of the 
macro picture of economy, demography, and politics that characterises different local 
contexts in which BCCCs operate.   
Despite its limitations, our study suggests that the notion of relationships has been 
and will continue to be centred in the discussion of the impact of COVID-19 on Christianity. 
Yi’s (2010: 165) argument that the challenges for Chinese Christians ‘are not how to adapt 
Christianity to Chinese society anymore, but how Chinese Christians can contribute to the 
global movement of world Christianity’ is particularly worth noting amid the pandemic. It is 
thus our hope that the present study will stimulate more, and deeper, thoughts and work on 
OCCCs in a global context. Should that occur, our scholarly understanding of the rise of 
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Chinese Christianity and COVID-19 – two significant event in the recent history of world 
Christianity – will be the better for it.  
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